The Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995: Substantial Likelihood of Confusion by Prager, Eric A.
Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law 
Journal 
Volume 7 Volume VII 
Number 1 Volume VII Book 1 Article 8 
1996 
The Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995: Substantial 
Likelihood of Confusion 
Eric A. Prager 
Darby & Darby, P.C. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/iplj 
 Part of the Entertainment, Arts, and Sports Law Commons, and the Intellectual Property Law 
Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Eric A. Prager, The Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995: Substantial Likelihood of Confusion, 7 
Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 121 (1996). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/iplj/vol7/iss1/8 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law Journal 
by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, 







 The Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 
1995:  Substantial Likelihood of 
Confusion 
Eric A. Prager* 
 
INTRODUCTION 
It may be said without fear of contradiction that the big-
gest news in trademark law this past year was the entry into 
force of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995 (“Fed-
eral Trademark Dilution Act” or “Act”),1 which became ef-
fective on January 16, 1996.2  The reason for all the excite-
ment—which has manifested itself in scores of articles, 
speeches, CLEs, and the like—is two-fold.  First, the passage 
of the Act represents a triumph for the many corporations 
and practitioners that fought unsuccessfully to obtain a fed-
eral dilution provision in the Trademark Law Revision Act 
of 1988.3  Second, the passage of the Act represents a high-
water mark in the federal recognition of trademark rights, 
for the Act creates a genuine property right in trademarks 
separate and apart from any consumer confusion or decep-
tion.4  Indeed, the celebrants may remark that these victories 
 
* Associate, Darby & Darby P.C., New York, NY.  Columbia College, A.B. 
1990; Fordham University School of Law, J.D. 1993.  Portions of this Essay previ-
ously appeared in an article in the New York Law Journal. 
1. Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109 Stat. 985 (1996) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125(c), 
1127). 
2. Id. 
3. Pub. L. No. 100-667, 102 Stat. 3935 (1988) (codified as amended at 15 
U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1994)). 
4. But see Illinois High Sch. Ass’n v. GTE Vantage Inc., 99 F.3d 244, 247 (7th 
Cir. 1996)  (Posner, Chief J.) (“Even antidilution statutes . . . do not elevate a 
trademark all the way to property. . . . [This is because] the existence of a mark 
that designates a particular source is presupposed.  When a mark becomes ge-
neric . . . [even] [a]n antidilution statute won’t resurrect it . . . .”).  It is submitted 
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could not have been sweeter, coming as they have on the fif-
tieth anniversary of the Lanham Act.5 
Now that the confetti and streamers have begun to settle, 
it is time to take a close look at this new statute and in par-
ticular to examine the ways in which it differs from the state 
statutes upon which it is ostensibly modeled.  That is the fo-
cus of this Essay.  Part I provides a short primer on dilution.  
Part II discusses the Federal Trademark Dilution Act, includ-
ing the primary differences between it and analogous state 
statutes.  Part III discusses the new requirements imposed by 
the federal statute over and above those of the state statutes.  
This Essay concludes that there are few substantial differ-
ences between the new federal statute and the existing state 
statutes of which courts and practitioners must be aware. 
I. BACKGROUND:  A SHORT PRIMER ON DILUTION 
It seems appropriate to begin with a short primer on the 
Federal Trademark Dilution Act, on dilution generally, and 
on how dilution fits into the trademark landscape.  Dilution 
is a special kind of damage to a trademark, and it must be 
distinguished at the outset from trademark infringement.  
Trademark infringement occurs when one party adopts a 
trademark which is the same as or is so similar to an existing 
mark that, when it is applied to the second-comer’s goods, 
the relevant purchasing public is likely to be confused, mis-
taken, or deceived as between the goods themselves or the 
relationship between the parties that make the goods.6  This 
“likelihood of confusion” is the touchstone of liability,7 and it 
is actionable under both the federal trademark statute (the 
                                                                                                                                  
that dilution statutes do elevate trademarks “all the way to property,” but that 
the property interest may be limited or destroyed by external factors analogous 
to adverse possession or prescriptive easement. 
5. Trademark Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-489, 60 Stat. 427 (1946) (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127) [hereinafter Lanham Act]. 
6. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (1994); see, e.g., Cadbury Beverages, Inc. v. Cott Corp., 
73 F.3d 474, 477 (2d Cir. 1996). 
7. See 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a).  
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Lanham Act) and the state law of every state. 
Dilution, by contrast, is the diminishment over time of 
the capacity of a distinctive trademark to identify the source 
of goods bearing that mark.  This is a serious injury to a 
trademark because a mark’s capacity to identify a particular 
source is its raison d’être; it is the very definition of what it 
means to be a trademark.  Dilution can occur even in the ab-
sence of consumer confusion, when a mark is used on unre-
lated goods.  The damage is manifested not in diverted cus-
tomers, but in harm to the mark itself—to its uniqueness, to 
its singularity, to its capacity to identify the source of goods 
sold under it.8  Dilution was not actionable under federal 
law prior to the Federal Trademark Dilution Act; it was, 
however, actionable under state law in approximately half 
the states.  Under the state statutes, a plaintiff usually could 
make out a cause of action for dilution if it could show that 
its trademark was distinctive (i.e., actually served to identify 
source) and that the defendant’s mark was likely to dilute 
the plaintiff’s mark. 
It is generally held that there are two general types of di-
lution:  dilution by blurring and dilution by tarnishment.  
Blurring occurs when a distinctive trademark is used in con-
nection with non-competing goods such that the uniqueness 
of the mark and its capacity to identify source is damaged.9  
 
8. The customary hypothetical examples of dilutive uses of distinctive 
marks (which, incidentally, are examples of dilution by blurring) include BUICK 
aspirin, KODAK pianos, and DUPONT shoes.  See N.Y. LEGIS. ANN. 49 (1954), 
cited in Allied Maintenance Corp. v. Allied Mechanical Trades, Inc., 369 N.E.2d 
1162, 1164 (N.Y. 1977) (Cooke, J., dissenting).  The presence in the marketplace of 
BUICK aspirin would tend to dilute BUICK for automobiles because—it is as-
sumed—consumers would cease to think exclusively of automobiles when they 
hear the name BUICK, and this result could be all the more pronounced if there 
also existed BUICK swimsuits, BUICK toothbrushes, and a BUICK airline (all of 
which ought to be permitted to enter the market if BUICK aspirin may).  On the 
other hand, if consumers mistakenly believed that General Motors had begun 
selling analgesics under its BUICK trademark (or licensing another company to 
do so), that would be trademark infringement. 
9. Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Prods., Inc., 73 F.3d 497, 506 (2d Cir. 
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Tarnishment occurs when a distinctive trademark is “‘linked 
to products of shoddy quality, or is portrayed in an un-
wholesome or unsavory context,’ with the result that ‘the 
public will associate the lack of quality or lack of prestige in 
the defendant’s goods with the plaintiff’s unrelated 
goods.’”10  The Federal Trademark Dilution Act is intended 
to reach both types of dilution.11 
The laws proscribing trademark infringement and 
trademark dilution seek to protect different rights and pre-
vent different harms.  The laws proscribing trademark in-
fringement serve to protect consumers and market competi-
tion.  They seek to protect consumers from being confused, 
mistaken, or deceived in their purchasing decisions by the 
presence in the marketplace of two or more trademarks that 
are so similar (when used in connection with particular 
goods) that they are likely to cause that confusion, mistake, 
or deception; this permits consumers to rely on trademarks 
as accurate source indicators.12  Trademark owners also 
benefit from this consumer protection, and trademark in-
fringement law has been no less protective of companies that 
invest heavily—through advertising, marketing, and promo-
tion—in raising public awareness of their distinctive trade-
marks. 
The laws proscribing trademark dilution, however, serve 
a different purpose.  Dilution does not hurt consumers; it 
hurts trademarks and their owners.  Trademark dilution law 
seeks to protect the trademark owner’s rights in a mark it-
self, and this may help to explain why it has taken dilution 
                                                                                                                                  
1996). 
10. Id. at 507 (quoting Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 41 F.3d 39, 43 (2d 
Cir. 1994)). 
11. H.R. REP. NO. 374, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1995), reprinted in 1995 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1031; see also Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. Akkaoui, No. C 96-3381 CW, 
slip op. at 5 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 29, 1996); Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined 
Shows, Inc. v. B.E. Windows Corp., 937 F. Supp. 204, 208 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). 
12. 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 2.01 (3d ed. 1992 & Supp. 1996). 
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law so long to take hold, even as infringement law has blos-
somed.  In any event, there is no doctrinal reason why a par-
ticular mark or designation could not both infringe and di-
lute another’s trademark; indeed, many cases involving state 
dilution statutes have considered dilution analysis unneces-
sary once they have found infringement.13 
This is the background from which the Federal Trade-
mark Dilution Act has come. 
II. THE FEDERAL TRADEMARK DILUTION ACT 
The Federal Trademark Dilution Act adds a new subsec-
tion (c) to section 43 of the Lanham Act; this is the operative 
provision, and it is codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c).14  The Act 
also adds a new definition⎯viz of “dilution”—to section 45 
of the Lanham Act; this is codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1127.15 
The Act roughly follows the two-step analysis of state di-
lution statutes but with two very important differences that 
will be discussed below.  First, whereas state statutes have 
required that a mark be distinctive or strong in its capacity to 
identify source,16 the Federal Trademark Dilution Act re-
quires that a mark be “famous,” and the Act provides a non-
exclusive list of eight factors that courts may consider in de-
termining whether a mark is famous.17  Second, whereas 
state statutes have required that a claimant prove a “likeli-
hood of dilution” of its trademark,18 the Federal Trademark 
 
13. See, e.g., Saban Entertainment, Inc. v. 222 World Corp., 865 F. Supp. 1047, 
1055 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). 
14. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c) (West Supp. 1996). 
15. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1127 (West Supp. 1996). 
16. See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 14330 (West 1987 & Supp. 1996); ILL. 
ANN. STAT. ch. 765, para. 1035/15 (Smith-Hurd 1993); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 368-d 
(McKinney 1996); MODEL STATE TRADEMARK ACT § 12 (1964). 
17. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c)(1)(A)-(H); see infra note 37 (listing these eight fac-
tors). 
18. See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 14330 (West 1987 & Supp. 1996); ILL. 
ANN. STAT. ch. 765, para. 1035/15 (Smith-Hurd 1993); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 368-d 
(McKinney 1996); MODEL STATE TRADEMARK ACT § 12 (1964). 
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Dilution Act requires that a claimant prove that the second-
comer’s use “causes dilution” of its trademark.19  These are 
substantial differences from the state dilution statutes, and 
they pose interesting questions and problems. 
The Act contains other notable provisions as well.  For 
instance, the legislative history of the Act states in no uncer-
tain terms that the Act does “not pre-empt existing state di-
lution statutes.”20  However, the Act itself provides that the 
ownership of a federal registration for a trademark “shall be 
a complete bar” to an action by another for dilution based on 
that trademark under the federal or a state dilution law.21  
This certainly provides new incentives to register one’s 
marks and to oppose the registration of similar marks even 
for unrelated goods; the Act does not, however, require a 
claimant to register its own mark to avail itself of the new 
federal cause of action.  In addition, the Act specifies that in-
junctive relief is the usual remedy for dilution but that actual 
damages, treble damages, and attorney fees may be awarded 
in cases of willful dilution.22  This, of course, impliedly indi-
cates that good faith can provide no defense to liability for 
dilution.  Finally, the Act provides a safe harbor for publish-
ing activities, non-commercial uses of a mark, and compara-
tive advertising.23  These are standard fair use provisions 
akin to the infringement defenses provided in section 
33(b)(4) of the Lanham Act24 and to those required by the 
First Amendment.25 
III. THE FEDERAL DILUTION REQUIREMENTS 
As noted above, the Federal Trademark Dilution Act 
 
19. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c)(1) (West Supp. 1996). 
20. H.R. REP. NO. 374, supra note 11, at 4, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 
1031. 
21. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c)(3) (West Supp. 1996). 
22. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c)(2) (West Supp. 1996). 
23. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c)(4) (West Supp. 1996). 
24. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (1994). 
25. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
    
1996] FEDERAL TRADEMARK DILUTION ACT 127 
does not simply “federalize” the existing state dilution laws; 
it creates a new eligibility standard for protection, and it cre-
ates a new liability standard for recovery. 
A. The New Eligibility Standard for Protection 
A trademark is not entitled to the protection of the new 
federal statute unless it is “famous,” and the Act provides a 
non-exclusive list of eight factors that courts may consider in 
determining whether a mark is famous.  This is a significant 
departure from the state statutes, which typically have re-
quired only “distinctiveness.”26   
Distinctiveness, of course, is the level of uniqueness re-
quired for protection against trademark infringement, and  it 
makes sense that some greater level of uniqueness is re-
quired for dilution protection, which is available even in the 
absence of consumer confusion.  However, the concept of a 
“famous” mark has not previously been part of United States 
jurisprudence; although certain marks may be famous in a 
colloquial sense, legal conclusions have not flowed from the 
characterization. 
The concept of “famous” or “well-known” marks with 
special rights derives from the Paris Convention for the Pro-
tection of Industrial Property,27 and in particular from article 
 
26. See, e.g., Merriam-Webster, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 35 F.3d 65, 73 (2d 
Cir. 1994) (“In order to prevail on a claim of dilution under [the New York State 
dilution statute], the plaintiff must prove . . . that its trade dress or trademark 
either is of truly distinctive quality or has acquired secondary meaning . . . .”); 
Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 875 F.2d 1026, 1030 (2d 
Cir. 1989) (“First, plaintiff’s mark must possess a distinctive quality capable of 
dilution. . . . Distinctiveness for dilution purposes often has been equated with 
strength of a mark for infringement purposes. . . . It also has been defined as 
uniqueness or as having acquired a secondary meaning.”).  But see Sally Gee, Inc. 
v. Myra Hogan, Inc., 699 F.2d 621, 625 (2d Cir. 1983) (“In [Allied Maintenance 
Corp. v. Allied Mechanical Trades, Inc., 369 N.E.2d 1162 (N.Y. 1977)] the majority 
indicated that the anti-dilution statute protects only extremely strong marks, 
perhaps not even all those that qualify as arbitrary or fanciful.” (citations omit-
ted)). 
27. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, 
13 U.S.T. 1, T.I.A.S. No. 4931, as revised, Stockholm, July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 
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6bis of the Convention.28  The legislative history of the Fed-
eral Trademark Dilution Act states that “the recently con-
cluded Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights29 (‘TRIPS’) which was part of the Uruguay 
Round30 of the GATT agreement includes a provision de-
signed to provide dilution protection to famous marks.  
Thus, enactment of this bill will be consistent with the terms 
of the agreement . . . .”31  Therefore, enactment of the Act 
was to be consistent with the terms of the TRIPS agree-
ment.32 
As a factual matter, the legislative history of the Federal 
Trademark Dilution Act is wrong on this point.  The TRIPS 
agreement provides in its article 16(3) that Member Coun-
tries shall apply article 6bis of the Paris Convention to non-
competing goods, “provided that use of that trademark in re-
lation to those goods or services would indicate a connection 
between those goods or services and the owner of the regis-
tered trademark.”33  This is garden variety trademark in-
fringement under existing United States law, for section 
43(a) of the Lanham Act—as amended in 1988—already pro-
                                                                                                                                  
828 U.N.T.S. 305. 
28. Id. art. 6bis(1).  The Convention states: 
The countries of the Union undertake . . . to refuse or to cancel the regis-
tration, and to prohibit the use, of a trademark which constitutes a re-
production, an imitation, or a translation, liable to create confusion, of a 
mark considered by the competent authority of the country of registra-
tion or use to be well known in that country as being already the mark 
of a person entitled to the benefits of this Convention and used for iden-
tical or similar goods. . . . 
Id. 
29. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 33 
I.L.M. 1197, in General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade:  Multilateral Trade Ne-
gotiations Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Trade Ne-
gotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125, Annex 1C [hereinafter TRIPs]. 
30. Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 514(a), 108 Stat. 
4809, 4976-81 (1994) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 104A (1994)) [hereinafter 
URAA]. 
31. H.R. REP. NO. 374, supra note 11, at 4, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 
1031. 
32. Id. 
33. See TRIPs, supra note 29, § 16(3). 
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tects against such false indications of a “connection.”34 
It is not clear from the legislative history of the Federal 
Trademark Dilution Act whether Congress intended to in-
corporate the international concept of famous marks into 
United States law, but the concept is certainly not well-
developed in domestic caselaw.  This author could find only 
one case in which a United States court applied article 6bis to 
provide protection in the United States for a foreign trade-
mark.35  However, that court made a variety of findings of 
fact that it applied to both its trademark infringement analy-
sis under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act and its unfair 
competition analysis under article 6bis of the Paris Conven-
tion.36  The court did not articulate any criteria for the spe-
cific purpose of determining when a mark is well-known or 
famous, although it presumably considered the issue sub si-
lentio. 
As for the eight “famousness” factors in the new federal 
statute, they are reasonable in and of themselves,37 but they 
 
34. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (1994) (creating liability where second-comer’s use 
of mark “is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the 
affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another person, or as to 
the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods”). 
35. Laboratorios Roldan, C. por A. v. Tex Int’l, Inc., 902 F. Supp. 1555, 1569 
(S.D. Fla. 1995). 
36. Id. at 1560-62. 
37. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c)(1) explicitly authorizes courts to consider: 
(A) the degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the mark;  
(B) the duration and extent of use of the mark in connection with 
the goods or services with which the mark is used;  
(C) the duration and extent of advertising and publicity of the 
mark;  
(D) the geographical extent of the trading area in which the mark is 
used; 
(E) the channels of trade for the goods or services with which the 
mark is used;  
(F) the degree of recognition of the mark in the trading areas and 
channels of trade used by the marks’ [sic] owner and the person against 
whom the injunction is sought;  
(G) the nature and extent of use of the same or similar marks by 
third parties; and  
(H) whether the mark was registered under the Act of March 3, 
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are little more than a compilation of factors that courts have 
traditionally used to assess the strength of a mark for pur-
poses of trademark infringement analysis.  Accordingly, 
they ought not to require renewed treatment unless courts 
begin to apply the factors differently in dilution cases than 
they have in infringement cases, and courts have not yet be-
gun such a departure.  It may be that fame is intended to be 
a synonym for “super-distinctiveness,” and this would be 
consistent with the caselaw under the state statutes and with 
Congress’ eight factors.  Unfortunately, however, the legisla-
tive history has foregone the opportunity to make this clear. 
B. The New Liability Standard for Recovery 
The owner of a famous trademark cannot make out a 
claim under the new federal statute unless it can prove that 
the second-comer’s use “causes dilution” of the owner’s 
mark.  As noted above, this is a higher hurdle than that fac-
ing plaintiffs under state dilution statutes, which permit re-
covery upon a showing of a “likelihood of dilution.” 
The courts have not yet made clear what evidence they 
will require to establish the actual coming to pass of dilution, 
and the legislative history of the Federal Trademark Dilution 
Act is silent on this seemingly important point.  Interest-
ingly, the legislative history does state that “federal trade-
mark law presently coexists with state trademark law, and it 
is to be expected that a federal dilution statute should simi-
larly coexist with state dilution law.”38  While it is far from 
clear, this statement may be read to mean that the federal di-
lution provision is intended to be generally coextensive with 
state dilution provisions, just as federal trademark infringe-
ment law is generally coextensive with state trademark in-
fringement law. 
It is reasonable to anticipate that past analysis of liability 
                                                                                                                                  
1881, or the Act of February 20, 1905, or on the principal register. 
15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c)(1). 
38. H.R. REP. 374, supra note 11, at 4, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1031. 
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under state dilution statutes will play a role in future analy-
sis under the federal statute, and there are some thoughtful 
decisions construing state dilution statutes prior to the en-
actment of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act.  However, 
these decisions must be used carefully because they are 
aimed at determining likelihood of dilution, not actual cau-
sation.  This author has previously collaborated to suggest a 
framework for analyzing dilution claims under the new fed-
eral statute,39 and that framework will not be repeated in full 
here.  It is appropriate, though, to discuss here the means 
that may be used to prove that a second-comer’s mark 
“causes dilution,” since proof of this point appears now to be 
a requirement in all cases under the federal statute. 
Logically, a defendant’s mark does not “cause dilution” 
of a plaintiff’s mark until the plaintiff’s mark has suffered 
actual dilution.  State dilution statutes have been, and con-
tinue to be, appealing because they provide a remedy before 
this damage has begun.  Actual dilution—like actual confu-
sion in trademark infringement cases—may be proved in 
two ways:  by anecdotal evidence and by certain types of 
survey evidence. 
It is difficult to conceive of anecdotal evidence of dilution 
by blurring, but one can imagine anecdotal evidence of dilu-
tion by tarnishment.  This evidence would consist of testi-
mony from the plaintiff’s former customers who declare that 
they no longer purchase from the plaintiff because they 
think the quality of its products has declined (when, in fact, 
it has not and when the defendant’s tarnishing activities 
have been under way).  This sort of evidence will be hard to 
find in the first instance and hard to attribute exclusively to 
the defendant’s activities, since many other market factors 
may influence the former customer’s opinions.  However, 
this kind of anecdotal evidence ought to be highly persua-
 
39. Ethan Horwitz & Eric A. Prager, What Is Dilution and How Is It Proved?, 
N.Y. L.J., Dec. 2, 1996, at S7. 
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sive when it does “stick,” just as anecdotal evidence of actual 
confusion is highly persuasive in trademark infringement 
cases.40 
Survey evidence should be easier to adduce, both in the 
tarnishment and blurring contexts.41  In the tarnishment con-
text, actual dilution can be demonstrated using a two-cell 
product attribute survey.  A control cell is used to measure 
the attributes that consumers who are unfamiliar with the 
defendant’s mark associate with the plaintiff’s mark (e.g., 
wholesome, family-oriented, good value, etc.); many con-
sumer products companies routinely conduct attribute sur-
veys of their famous brands, and it may be possible to use 
this data.  The test cell is used to measure the attributes that 
consumers who have been exposed to the allegedly tarnish-
ing product associate with the plaintiff’s mark.  If the attrib-
utes decline, there has been tarnishment (assuming any 
other market factors can be excluded or quantified).  This 
type of attribute survey will show actual dilution if the par-
ticipants in the test cell have been exposed to the defendant’s 
mark in the marketplace, rather than as a survey stimulus. 
In the blurring context, actual dilution can be demon-
strated by showing a diminishment in the strength of the 
plaintiff’s mark—in terms of purchasing power—before and 
after the allegedly diluting use.  One way to test this strength 
would be to measure and use survey-derived likelihood of 
confusion readings as a surrogate for (or even definition of) 
strength.  In this type of test, the plaintiff—which owns the 
 
40. See, e.g., Grotrian, Helfferich, Schultz, Th. Steinweg Nachf. v. Steinway & 
Sons, 365 F. Supp. 707, 715-16 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (“Although evidence of actual con-
fusion is not essential to a finding of trademark infringement, there can be no 
more positive proof of likelihood of confusion than evidence of actual confu-
sion.”), modified on other grounds, 523 F.2d 1331 (2d Cir. 1975); Lon Tai Shing Co. 
Ltd. v. Koch + Lowy, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1081, 1089 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (“a few 
proven instances of actual confusion betoken a more substantial likelihood of 
confusion”) (citing cases). 
41. Substantial credit for the survey analysis in this Essay is owed to Ethan 
Horwitz of Darby & Darby whose contribution is gratefully acknowledged. 
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mark “X” for food and seeks to prove that the use by the de-
fendant of X for automobiles is likely to dilute the mark—
would create a control cell using a standard likelihood of 
confusion survey to quantify the degree to which consumers 
who are not aware of the use of X on automobiles would be 
confused by the presence in the market of X on, for example, 
bicycles.  Then, the plaintiff would execute a test cell using 
consumers who are aware of the use of X on automobiles to 
quantify the degree to which they would be confused by the 
presence in the market of X on bicycles.  If the test cell shows 
a lower confusion rating than the control cell, there has been 
dilution. 
To date, there has been only one case in which the federal 
dilution statute was applied at trial, and there, the court 
found and enjoined dilution based at least in part on the 
plaintiff’s survey evidence.  Wawa, Inc. v. Haaf,42 the parties 
consented to consolidate the hearing on the plaintiff’s mo-
tion for a preliminary injunction with trial on the merits.  
The plaintiff owned the mark WAWA for convenience store 
services; the defendants had begun using the mark HAHA 
for the same services.  Wawa submitted a marketing survey 
in support of its dilution claim, and the court found the sur-
vey persuasive:  “[p]laintiff buttresses its position by intro-
ducing evidence of a marketing survey which concludes that 
persons in HAHA’s neighborhood who were interviewed 
about Defendant’s market tended, in 29% of the cases, to as-
sociate Defendant’s market with a Wawa market.”43  Unfor-
tunately, however, the court did not provide any more detail 
than this. 
Courts may also elect to find “actual dilution” based 
upon a finding of bad faith or predatory intent.  In fact, two 
of the four cases that have to date reached the merits of a 
federal dilution claim have appeared to rule implicitly on 
 
42. 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1629 (E.D. Pa. 1996). 
43. Id. at 1632. 
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this basis.44  Under strict analysis, of course, this is neither a 
form of nor even evidence of dilution.  However, courts 
have viewed predatory intent as relevant to their dilution 
analyses because of the equitable origins of the dilution doc-
trine.45  This approach seems sensible under the federal dilu-
tion statute, which by its very terms provides protection 
“subject to the principles of equity and upon such terms as 
the court deems reasonable.”46  This approach is also consis-
tent with that taken under trademark infringement analysis, 
wherein intentional copying of a trademark gives rise to a 
presumption of a likelihood of confusion.47 
In addition, one court has suggested that—where identi-
cal marks are concerned—dilution may be found under the 
new federal statute upon a sort of res ipsa loquitur analysis.  
In Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. B.E. 
Windows Corporation,48 the court opined that in cases where a 
junior user’s mark is identical to the senior user’s mark dilu-
tion by blurring is “obvious” since “the public now associ-
ates [the mark] with a single source.”49  However, in that 
same case, the court took a surprisingly restrictive view of 
what it means to be a similar mark, and it proceeded to find 
no dilution under the new federal statute (despite the fact 
 
44. See Panavision Int’l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1908 (C.D. 
Cal. 1996) (F. Supp. publication pending); Intermatic Inc. v. Toeppen, 40 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1412 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (F. Supp. publication pending).  These 
two cases were brought against the same individual defendant who made a 
business of registering the trade names of over 200 major corporations as Internet 
domain names and attempting to sell the domain names back to the corpora-
tions.  Panavision and Intermatic each sued under the federal dilution statute to 
force the return of the domain names.  Each moved for summary judgment, and 
each succeeded on that basis. 
45. See, e.g., Sally Gee, Inc. v. Myra Hogan, Inc., 699 F.2d 621, 626 (2d Cir. 
1983). 
46. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c)(1). 
47. See, e.g., Warner Bros., Inc. v. American Broadcasting Cos., 720 F.2d 231, 
246-47 (2d Cir. 1983); Harold F. Ritchie, Inc. v. Cheseborough-Pond’s, Inc., 281 
F.2d 755, 758-59 (2d Cir. 1960). 
48. 937 F. Supp. 204 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). 
49. Id. at 210. 
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that the court read a “likelihood of dilution,” rather than 
“causes dilution,” standard into the statute).50 
The idea that dilution is more likely when identical 
marks are at issue is not a controversial one.  Similarity of 
the marks in suit is one of the six factors in the “traditional” 
dilution test by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.51  
However, identicality of the marks has not previously been 
offered in and of itself as “obvious” proof of blurring.  The 
usual formulation has called for a balancing of the six fac-
tors.52 
It is clear in any event that the Federal Trademark Dilu-
 
50. Id. at 210-11. 
51. The test was created by Judge Sweet in his concurring opinion in Mead 
Data Central, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 875 F.2d 1026 (2d Cir. 1989).  
By 1994, the Second Circuit had begun to call the test “traditional.”  See Deere & 
Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 41 F.3d 39, 43 (2d Cir. 1994).  The six factors are:  (1) 
similarity of the marks, (2) similarity of the products covered by the marks, (3) 
sophistication of consumers, (4) predatory intent, (5) renown of the senior mark, 
and (6) renown of the junior mark.  Mead Data Cent., 875 F.2d at 1035 (Sweet, J., 
concurring). 
52. Mead Data Cent., 875 F.2d at 1039-40 (Sweet, J., concurring).  The six-
factor test is valuable because it provides at least some mode of analysis, but it is 
also flawed in substantial ways.  The first factor—similarity of the marks—
certainly merits consideration in the blurring analysis.  However, the second fac-
tor—similarity of the products—does not belong in the analysis because blurring 
is no less cognizable when it occurs in connection with unrelated goods; in fact, 
this may be the archetypal blurring situation.  The third factor—sophistication of 
the consumers—does not belong in the analysis either.  While the sophistication 
of consumers is certainly relevant in determining whether they are likely to be 
confused among goods in the marketplace, dilution law has a different aim and 
operation.  There is no reason to think that a diluted mark will be less diluted 
among sophisticated consumers than among unsophisticated consumers; indeed, 
the opposite may be true if sophisticated consumers are capable of retaining 
more “meanings” for any particular mark.  See Alexander F. Simonson, How and 
When Do Trademarks Dilute:  A Behavioral Framework to Judge “Likelihood” of Dilu-
tion, 83 TRADEMARK REP. 149, 154 n.27 (1993).  The fourth factor—predatory in-
tent—merits consideration, although it is not technically germane to the analysis.  
The fifth factor—renown of the senior mark—is redundant, since one may not 
get to the blurring analysis without clearing the distinctive or famous mark hur-
dle.  Finally, the sixth factor—renown of the junior mark—does not belong in the 
analysis because the renown of the junior mark measures only the probable ra-
pidity of dilution (assuming, as this Essay has been, that the senior mark is dis-
tinctive and capable of being diluted). 
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tion Act should work a major change in proof of dilution 
claims at the federal level.  While courts have not yet articu-
lated the level of proof they will require to establish a dilu-
tion claim, there do exist means to show “actual dilution” if 
courts read the new statute as requiring this level of proof. 
CONCLUSION 
The provisions of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act 
have a familiar ring to them, but there are very important 
differences between the new federal statute and the state 
statutes with which many are familiar.  This is certainly no 
cause for alarm, but it is no less certainly worthy of atten-
tion.  Courts will play a major role in determining the metes 
and bounds of federal dilution protection, and it may be 
some time before the effects of the Federal Trademark Dilu-
tion Act can be fully understood. 
 
